# The China-U.S. Trade War and Future Economic Relations

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
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
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\*All opinions expressed herein are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of any of the organisations with which the author is affiliated.

#### Quarterly Rates of Growth of Chinese Real GDP, Y-o-Y



#### The Different Measurements of the Bilateral Trade Balance



# The Different Measurements of the Diletonel

Baranee: 11 Samma J	
Summary of Different Measurements of the China-U.S. Trade Balance	

**Our Estimates** 

356.4

350.9

312.1

276.0

Official U.S. Estimates

419.6

380.8

4

THE BILLETONE IVIOUS GIVING OF THE BILLETON
Trade Balance: A Summary

**Official Chinese Estimates** 

323.3

268.4

Measurement

**Goods Only (FOB-CIF)** 

**Goods Only FOB** 

**Goods and Services** 

Goods, including Re-

**Exports, FOB** 

Goods, including Re-**Exports, FOB, and Services** 

> (U.S. Data) Goods, including Re-


**Exports, FOB, and Services** 

(Imports)

The Different Measurements of the Difateral
Trade Balance: A Summary

The Different Measurements of the Bilateral
Trade Balance: A Summary

#### Chinese Trade Surplus and U.S. Trade Deficit in Goods and Services as Percents of Respective GDPs



# The Relative Benefits from the Bilateral Trade

in	Terms	of	Value-Added:	A Summary	

Summary of Comparisons of Relative Deficitis							
Magguramant	China	The U.S.	Difforma				

110.5

239.1

129.8 161.0

Summary of Comparisons of Palativa Ranafita Cnina 1ne U.S. Measurement Difference **Direct Value-Add** 159.8 128.6 31.2


240.2

400.0


**Indirect Value-Added** 

**Total Value-Added** 


## The Chinese, Hong Kong and U.S. Stock Market Indexes, 2018M1 to Date




## The Quarterly Rates of Growth of Chinese Real GDP versus the Chinese Stock Price Index




#### The RMB Central Parity Exchange Rate and the CFETS Index, 29/12/2017 to the Present




## Chinese Exports of Goods and Services and Goods Only as a Percent of Chinese GDP




#### Chinese Exports of Goods and Services and Goods to the U.S. as Percent of Chinese GDP




## The Distribution of U.S. Apparel Imports by Countries and Regions of Origin




## Exports to the World as Percent of GDP: Hong Kong




## Exports to the U.S. as Percent of GDP: Hong Kong




## U.S. Exports of Goods and Services and Goods Only as Percent of U.S. GDP




#### U.S. Exports of Goods and Services and Goods Only to China as Percent of U.S. GDP




## Growth Rate vs. Level of Real GDP per Capita (2018 tril. US\$): China, Japan and the U.S.




#### Comparison of National Savings Rates: China, Japan and the U.S.




# Comparison of Capital-Labour Ratios: China, Japan and the U.S.




#### Scatter Diagram between the Shares of Employment and GDP of the Primary Sector




#### Actual and Projected Levels and Growth Rates of Chinese and U.S. Real GDP (2018 tril. US\$)




#### Actual and Projected Chinese and U.S. Real GDP/Capita and Their Annual Rates of Growth (1,000 2018 US\$ & %)




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
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
#### R&D Expenditures as a Share of GDP and Their Target Levels at 2020: G-7 Countries, 4 East Asian NIEs, China & Israel




#### Patents Granted in the United States: G-7 Countries, 4 East Asian NIEs, China & Israel




## U.S. Patents Granted and R&D Capital Stocks: G-7 Countries, 4 EANIEs, China & Israel



# Basic Research Expenditure as a Share of Total R&D Expenditure: China, Japan and the U.S.



# Technological Competition: Cumulative Number of Nobel Laureates in Physics



#### Economic Complementarities between China and the U.S.

	China					
	2015	2016	2017	2015	2016	2017
Population, thousands persons	1,374,620	1,382,710	1,390,080	321,323	323,668	325,983
Arable land, thousand hectare	134,999	134,921	134,863	152,263	152,263	
Tangible capital stock, 2016 prices, US\$ billions	21,268	23,405	25,351	26,953	27,657	28,061
Real R&D capital stock, 2016 prices, US\$ billions	898	1,015	1,139	4,005	4,106	4,205
Working-age population (ages 15-64), persons	996,030,376	995,072,896	993,792,919	212,357,568	213,254,816	213,911,387
Sources:						
Population, yearend for China, from National Bure	au of Staistics of Ch	ina (NBSC) and mid	year for the U.S., the	U.S. Bureau of Econ	omic Analysis (BE A	).
Arable land, for China, from the National Bureau o	f Statistics of China	, and for the U.S. fro	m the Food and Ag	riculture Organisatio	n of the United Natio	ns

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Tangible capaital stock, estimated by Lawrence J. Lau from national income accounts data.

Working-age population, from the World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) Database.

Real R&D capital stock, estimated by Lawrence J. Lau and Yanyan Xiong (2018).

Economic C	omplei	nenta	rities 1	betwee	en Chi	ina
and the U.S.						
		China			U.S.	
	2015	2016	2017	2015	2016	2017
Arable land per capita, hectare	0.098	0.098	0.097	0.474	0.470	

734

819

12,463

12,685

12,900

654

Real R&D capital stock per

capita, in 2016 prices, US\$

Working age population per

	China			U.S.		
	2015	2016	2017	2015	2016	2017
Arable land per capita, hectare	0.098	0.098	0.097	0.474	0.470	
Real capital stock per capita, in 2016 prices, US\$	15,472	16,927	18,237	83,880	85,448	86,080

#### **Concluding Remarks**

- ◆ The competition between China and the U.S., whether friendly or unfriendly, can be assumed to be an ongoing and long-term one. It is the "new normal". The trade dispute is only a symptom of the potential possible conflicts between the two countries.
- ◆ Prof. Graham Allison, of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, has written a book titled **Destined for War**, about the inevitability of a war between China and the U.S. As a rising power challenges the dominance of an established power, the established power is likely to respond with force. He refers to this "inevitability" as the "Thucydides Trap", drawing on the book by Thucydides, **History of the Peloponnesian War**, a war in ancient Greece (431-404 B.C.) between Athens and Sparta₃₂

#### Concluding Remarks

- ◆ The Chinese economy grew 6.3% in 2019H1, it should be able to achieve a real rate of growth of at least 6% for 2019 as a whole.
- ◆ Regardless of the ultimate outcome of the China-U.S. trade war, the Chinese economy is poised to grow at an average annual rate of between 5% and 6% over the next couple of decades.
- ◆ The U.S. economy is projected to grow at 3% per annum during the same period.
- ◆ The Chinese economy is likely to surpass the U.S. economy in terms of aggregate real GDP at market prices in the early 2030s.
- ◆ However, Chinese real GDP per capita will lag behind that of the U.S. until at least the end of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

#### **Concluding Remarks**

- ◆ In the long run, if China and the U.S. cooperate and work together, many global problems such as prevention of climate change, denuclearisation, and the economic development of Africa, can be solved.
- ◆ China and the U.S. can both collaborate and compete in finding cures for diseases such as cancer and Alzheimer's disease, and every country in the world will benefit from it.
- ◆ The U.S. can invite China to participate in the exploration of Mars and share in the cost, which has been estimated to be hundreds of billions of U.S. dollars.
- ◆ If the two countries compete in a friendly way, much innovation is possible, as in the competition to build the fastest supercomputer. The two countries should aim to become **competitive** partners!